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Abstract
In many regulated industries labour unions are strong and there is clear
empirical evidence of labour rent-sharing. We study optimal regulation in
a model in which wages are determined endogenously by wage bargaining
at the ￿rm level. Compared to the case in which wages do not depend on
the regime under which the ￿rm is regulated, allowing for endogenously
determined wages has ambiguous e⁄ects on the the regulatory contract.
A seemingly robust conclusion, at least when worker bargaining power is
considerable, is that incentives for cost e¢ciency should be stronger. Nev-
ertheless, social welfare may well be higher.
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Traditionally, labor unions have been strong in many regulated industries. Wages
and working conditions are determined by bargaining between unions and em-
ployers, and industry regulators, who are responsible for designing pricing and
transfer schemes for the regulated rms, cannot usually control wages directly.
Nevertheless, the choice of regulatory policy is likely to inuence the outcome of
the wage bargaining process. Consider for example, cost of service regulation in
which rms are allowed a fair rate of return on capital. Based on historical costs
of labor and other inputs, regulated prices are xed at the level of average costs.
If costs are reviewed frequently, owners have little incentive to resist claims for
higher wages since an increase in wages is compensated for by a corresponding in-
crease in regulated prices. If, on the other hand, reviews are made less frequently,
the regulatory scheme becomes more high powered and provides stronger incen-
tives for cost reductions. Standard bargaining theory predicts that such a change
in regulatory policy results in an outcome with lower wages.
There is a considerable empirical literature devoted to the study of labor rent-
sharing in regulated industries.1 Ehrenberg (1979), in a detailed study of New
York Telephone, presents a large body of evidence suggesting that workers of
this company were paid a premium above non-union workers of comparable skills.
Rose (1987) used the impact of deregulation on wages in the US trucking industry
in the early 1980s to estimate rent-sharing in the pre-deregulation era, nding that
workers had captured more than two-thirds of total industry rents.2 Of particular
interest is the study by Hendricks (1975), who, by comparing wage settlements
between electric utilities in the US, found that wages were higher for utilities that
expected the regulator to adjust prices following a new wage agreement.
The interaction between regulatory policies and wage setting in regulated in-
dustries does not seem to have received much attention in the theory of regula-
tion. The standard approach has been to assume that, except for the rms level
of e¤ort, the cost structure of a regulated rm is exogenous.3 B a s e do nt h i s
assumption, the analysis has focused on the trade o¤ between providing incen-
tives for cost-reducing e¤orts and rents captured by the privately informed rm.
1See Hendricks (1986) for a survey, with particular emphasis on studies of the e⁄ects of
deregulation on wages.
2As one would expect, wage premiums in regulated industries di⁄er between industries, as
well as between ￿rms within a given industry. In contrast to results from the trucking industry,
Card (1996) found that relative earnings of airline workers declined by 10% after deregulation
and concludes that ￿taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that the rent premiums earned by
airline workers in the regulatory era were relatively modest￿.
3An exception is the literature studying the interaction between regulatory policy and ￿rms￿
investment incentives, see e.g. Riordan and Sappington (1989), Dalen (1995), and Tirole (1986).
2A fundamental insight from this literature is that by reducing the power of the
regulatory scheme, that is, by accepting a higher degree of cost pass-through, the
regulator may reduce rents captured by the rm. This may no longer be true how-
ever, if wages are determined endogenously. In this case, the choice of regulatory
scheme also inuences the allocation of rents within rms, and the relationship
between the power of the scheme and overall costs becomes more complicated.
In the next section, we present a straightforward extension of the La¤ont and
Tirole (1993) model to allow for endogenous wage determination. There are three
players; a regulator, a manager and a worker. The manager is asked by the
regulator to deliver a non-divisible good and receives a transfer depending on the
overall cost performance of the rm. Output requires the input of labor, and
costs are determined partly by the managers level of e¤ort and partly by the
workers wage. The wage, and possibly the e¤ort level of the manager, is subject
to negotiations between the manager and the worker.
We start our analysis in section 3, by focusing on how the regulatory contract
a¤ects the managers ability to resist claims for high wages. We consider a game
in which the regulator o¤ers a contract to the manager who subsequently bar-
gains with the worker over wage and managerial e¤ort. It turns out that total
rm rents is less sensitive to the power of the regulatory contract the stronger
is the bargaining power of the worker. Consequently, the optimal contract yields
stronger incentives when the manager lacks complete bargaining power than when
he captures the entire rm rent. Compared to a case in which the wage level is
xed exogenously at the expected outcome of the wage bargaining process, social
welfare is higher when wages are determined by bargaining at the rm level.
In section 4, we focus instead on how managerial incentives are a¤ected by
the fact that gains will have to be shared with the worker. We do this by con-
sidering a di¤erent a game in which managerial e¤ort is determined before wage
bargaining takes place. This introduces an additional distortion, as the managers
preferred e¤ort level generally depends on relative bargaining strength; in partic-
ular, the managers incentive to undertake costly e¤orts will be lower the stronger
is the bargaining power of the worker. This e¤ect turns out to have ambiguous
implications for the power of the optimal regulatory contract.
Lastly, in section 5 we briey discuss the possibility that the manager may act
strategically in the bargaining process to inuence regulatory policy. We show
that when the marginal gain from managerial e¤ort is positively related to the
level of labor costs the manager does indeed have an incentive to accept high wage
claims in order to induce the regulator to o¤er a high-powered contract and hence
capture larger rents. Section 6 concludes.
32. Analytical framework
There are three players; a regulator, a manager, and a worker. The regulator
o¤ers the manager a contract to undertake a given task, which also requires the
services of the worker. Total costs of production are given by
C = w + ¯ ¡ e; (2.1)
where w is the workers wage, ¯ is an e¢ciency parameter, and e is the managers
level of e¤ort. Neither the e¢ciency parameter nor e¤ort undertaken by the
manager are observable to the regulator, who regards ¯ as a random variable,
continuously distributed on the interval [¯;¯]. The manager is fully informed,
w h i l et h ew o r k e rm a yo rm a yn o to b s e r v e¯ and e. The wage is determined by
bargaining between the manager and the worker (we describe the details of the
bargaining technology in the next section).
The workers payo¤ is given by the wage w.T h e m a n a g e r  s p a y o ¤ w h e n
undertaking the task depends partly on the net transfers t from the regulator and
partly on his disutility of e¤ort Ã(e): ¼ = t¡Ã(e). As is standard in the literature,
we assume that Ã(0) = 0,t h a tÃ(e) is thrice continuously di¤erentiable, and that
Ã0(e) is positive, increasing and convex. We limit attention to regulatory contracts
that specify a linear relationship between costs of production and net transfers,
that is, t = a ¡ bC, so that the managers utility may be written as
¼ = a ¡ b[w + ¯ ¡ e] ¡ Ã(e): (2.2)
The objective function of the utilitarian regulator is assumed to be the sum of
consumer surplus generated by the undertaking of the task S and the managers
and the workers payo¤s:
SW = S ¡ [1 + ¸][t + C]+¼ + w; (2.3)
where 1+¸ is the (general equilibrium) costs of public funds. Inserting for C
from (2.1) and t = Ã + ¼ gives
SW = S ¡ [1 + ¸][¯ ¡ e + Ã(e)] ¡ ¸(¼ + w): (2.4)
Although the regulator puts equal weights on consumers surplus and the man-
agers and the workers surplus, the regulators objective function is decreasing
in both ¼ and w, because increasing transfers to the rm necessitates raising
distorting taxes elsewhere in the economy.
A fully informed regulator would set transfers as low as possible without violat-
ing the participation constraints of the worker and the manager, that is, without
reducing their pay-o¤s below their reservation values. At the full-information,
4rst-best solution, the marginal disutility of e¤ort equals the marginal cost sav-
ings of increased e¤orts; that is, Ã0(e)=1 .
The model has a number of distinguishing features which warrants comment.
Firstly, in order to simplify the analysis we disregard moral hazard problems
within the rm. In principle, one would want to allow for asymmetric informa-
tion between the worker and the manager as well to take into account how the
negotiated wage contract may a¤ect worker incentives. Multi-level, principal-
agent models are designed to address such issues, see e.g. Baron and Besanko
(1992) and Melumand et al (1995). However, although such an extension may be
useful, we do not believe it would alter signicantly the insights derived from our
simplied set up.
Secondly, while we assume that the regulator is able to commit fully to any
regulatory policy of his own choice, we allow for the possibility that the manager
is unable to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers to the worker. This is again in contrast
to the approach taken in the multi-level, principal-agent literature where it is gen-
erally assumed that at each level the superior is able to commit to any contract
with subordinates. Ideally, one would want to allow for more general bargaining
procedures at all levels of the hierarchy. However, due to the fundamental di¢-
culties in designing realistic and tractable models of bargaining under asymmetric
information, the mechanism design literature has traditionally resorted to highly
simplifying assumptions about the distribution of bargaining power between the
involved parties.4 We consider our model as a rst step towards a more realistic
modelling of contract settlement in multi-level hierarchies. Admittedly, our set up
introduces a certain asymmetry between the regulator-manager and the manager-
worker relationships. On the other hand, in certain settings such an asymmetry
might well be reasonable; if, for example, the regulator is facing a number of
di¤erent rms reputational e¤ects may provide commitment power.
Thirdly, we restrict attention to the case in which the regulator contracts with
the manager of the rm only and not with the workers directly. Furthermore, we
assume that the regulatory contracts are not conditioned on the workers wage. It
is a matter of fact that the jurisdiction of regulators typically do not include the
right to contract with workers or set standards for wages and working conditions,
and it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider why this is so.5 By restricting
the set of regulatory contracts, we are able to compare the performance of such
4Even under such assumptions, narrowing the range of reasonable outcomes may be prob-
lematic due to multiplicity of equilibria, see eg von der Fehr and K￿hn (1995).
5See Tirole (1994) for a discussion of the optimal organisation of government and reasons
for introducing multiple government agencies with limited jurisdiction. La⁄ont and Martimort
(1995) demonstrate that in order to avoid collusion and side-contracting between agents, dele-
gating incentive contracts may be optimal if communication between the upper and lower levels
of a hierarchy is not limitless.
5contracts with optimal regulation, which, in our simplied set up involves xing
the wage level at the workers reservation wage. In a more general setting, however,
allowing for regulatory contracts that condition on wage settlements would not
necessarily imply that the regulator preset wages entirely; if, for example, the
workers reservation wage is observed only imperfectly by the regulator an optimal
regulatory contract may well leave scope for wage premiums.
3. A¤ecting incentives to resist wage claims
Intuitively, it seems obvious that the regulatory contract may a¤ect the incentives,
and indeed the ability, of the management of regulated rms to resist wage claims.
In particular, one might expect that an optimal regulatory contract will provide
stronger incentives for cost e¢ciency (that is, allows less cost pass-through) when
workers are in a strong bargaining position. In this section we present a set up
designed to illustrate this intuition. In particular, we consider the following game:
The government rst o¤ers the manager a contract. If the contract is rejected,
the game ends, and both the worker and the manager obtain their reservation
utilities. If, on the other hand, the contract is accepted, the worker and the
manager bargain over the workers wage and managerial e¤ort (alternatively, as
we discuss in more detail in the next section, the manager decides upon e¤ort
after the wage is set).
In order to characterize the optimal regulatory contract, we proceed as follows:
First we solve the bargaining game for a given contract fa;bg and calculate the
expected cost and the expected transfer from the regulator to the manager. Then
we derive the optimal regulatory scheme as the contract that maximizes expected
social surplus.
3.1. The Bargaining Game
In this section, we assume that the manager and the worker are symmetrically
informed (we return to this assumption in later sections). Consequently, after
the manager has accepted the regulatory contract, he bargains with the worker
over e¤ort and wage, both parties taking into account how the outcome of the
bargaining game a¤ects costs and hence the transfer from the regulator. For
simplicity we assume that the outcome of the bargaining game is given by the Nash
sharing rule. Furthermore, we apply the common assumption in the labor market
literature that the relevant disagreement point is given by the agents outside
options, see for instance Pissarides (1990). We denote the workers disagreement
point by wr, while we normalize the rms disagreement point to zero. The Nash
product is then
6N =[ w ¡ w
r]
– ¼
1¡– =[ w ¡ w
r]
– fa ¡ b[¯ ¡ e + w] ¡ Ã(e)g
1¡– (3.1)
where ± denotes the bargaining power of the worker. The Nash solution is given
by the values of e and w that maximizes the Nash product. First-order conditions




r]=a ¡ b[w + ¯ ¡ e] ¡ Ã(e); and (3.2)
Ã
0(e)=b: (3.3)
The right-hand side of (3.2) shows the managers rent, which is equal to [1 ¡ ±]b=±
times the wage premium w ¡ wr. Consequently, the share of the rent that is
allocated to the worker is larger the smaller is b (the more incentive-powered is
the contract) and the higher is ±, the workers bargaining power. In particular,
if b is small, a large part of any wage increase is compensated for by an increase
in the transfers from the regulator. It is easy to see that the agreed wage rate is
decreasing in b.
Equation (3.3) denes the optimal value of managerial e¤ort e as an increasing




< 0 (since Ã0 is convex).
Note that e⁄ is independent of ¯ (this is not a general result, but follows from our
linear specication of the cost function). It also follows from equation (3.2) that
w is increasing in a as well; the more there is to bargain over, the higher is the
wage. The same holds for a decrease in the cost parameter ¯. Our ndings so far
can thus be summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 1. The wage agreement is given by w⁄ = w(a;b;¯;±;wr),w h e r e@w
@a >
0; @w
@b < 0; @w
@ﬂ < 0; @w
@– > 0 and @w
@wr > 0:
3.2. The optimal regulatory contract
We are now able to characterize the optimal policy of a regulator with perfect
foresight who is informed about the bargaining technology. Since managerial rent
is costly to the regulator, the contract will leave no net payo¤ to the least e¢cient
managerial type. Since the right-hand side in (3.2) shows the managerial rent, it
follows that the optimal contract yields w = wr at ¯ = ¯ (as long as b⁄ > 0). For















7That is, as long as the regulator makes sure that the worker and the manager of
the most ine¢cient type produce with binding participation constraints, the wage
level becomes independent of the power of the incentive scheme. To understand
this result, note that an increase in b (which increases the incentive to undertake
e¤ort) has two opposite e¤ects on the payo¤ of the worker. On the one hand,
an increase in b increases the total rent that is allocated to the rm. Since the
rent is shared between the worker and the manager, this e¤ect tends to increase
the wage. On the other hand, an increase in b reduces the responsiveness of
transfers to changes in wages, making wage increases more costly to the manager
and thereby reducing the workers bargaining position. With our parametrization
of the model, it turns out that the two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other.
Combining (2.2) and (3.2) gives ¼ =[ w ¡ wr][1¡ ±]=±.I n s e r t i n gf o rw from
(3.5) then gives us





Consequently, the managers payo¤ is higher the more productive is the rm (ie,
the lower is ¯)a n dt h eh i g h e ri st h ep o w e ro ft h ei n c e n t i v es c h e m e( b)a n dt h e
bargaining power of the manager (1 ¡ ±).
The combined rent obtained by the manager and the worker equals






The social planner sets b so as to maximize expected social welfare. Substi-
tuting (3.7) into (2.4) and taking expectations with respect to ¯, we nd that the
planners problem is to maximize






where e = e(b) is given implicitly by (3.2). By taking derivatives and recalling










Since, by assumption, Ã000(e) ¸ 0,w eh a v et h a te00(b) · 0. It follows that the
left-hand side of (3.9) is decreasing in b. Consequently, since the right-hand side
is independent of b, the solution is unique. Furthermore, a higher value of the
right-hand side implies a lower value of b.
In the case of symmetric information (¯ = ¯ = E¯), the optimal contract
makes the manager a residual claimant to the prot of the rm (b =1 ). Under
asymmetric information, however, the regulator trades of e¢ciency against infor-
mation rents and o¤ers a less high-powered incentive contract, since this reduces
8socially costly rents captured by e¢cient types. Note that when ± =1 ,t h eo p t i -
mal contract is to set b =1 .I nt h i sc a s e ,t h er e n tt ot h em a n a g e ri sa l w a y sz e r o .
Since the wage is independent of b, there is no trade-o¤ between e¢ciency and
rent in this case, and the rm (in e¤ect, the worker) is residual claimant.
We want to compare this regulatory contract with the optimal scheme in the
case in which wages are set independently of the regulatory contract (say, by wage
bargaining at the industry, or economy, level) and thus regarded as exogenous by
the regulator. Denote this exogenous wage by ¹ w. It is then easy to show that
this is a special case of our model obtained in the limit when ± ! 0,a n dw i t h¹ w
substituted in for the workers outside option.6 By inserting ± =0into (3.6) we







Comparing (3.10) and (3.6), we nd that the managers information rent is larger
when wages are exogenous than when they are determined by bargaining at the
rm level. On the other hand, this rent is less than the combined rent obtained
by the manager and the worker when they are allowed to bargain over wages; in
particular, comparing (3.7) and (3.10), we have ¼ + w ¡ wr >¼ E when ±>0
and b<1. This implies that cost di¤erences between rms will tend to be
smaller when wages are endogenous. With exogenous wages, any cost di¤erence
between rms can be traced back to di¤erences in e¢ciency (¯). When wages
are endogenous, however, e¢ciency di¤erences are partially mitigated by the fact
that more e¢cient types pays higher wages.
While the overall information rent to the rm is larger in the case with en-
dogenous wages, the marginal e¤ect on rents by an increase in b is nevertheless
smaller. In the case of an endogenous wage, the increase in rents from a marginal




. With an exogenous wage, however, the
corresponding increase in rents amounts to ¯ ¡ ¯. Consequently, we would ex-
pect the optimal contract to involve a smaller b when wages are exogenously set
than when they depend on the regulatory contract. Inserting wr = w and ± =0
into the welfare function (3.8), it follows that the planner with exogenous wages
chooses b so as to maximize
ES W





The rst-order condition for maximum is given by
6If the wage is determined outside the ￿rm, for instance by bargaining at the industry level,
this wage will typically di⁄er from the relevant outside option for the worker in the case that
wages are determined by in-￿rm bargaining.To emphasise this, we use di⁄erent symbols for the









Consequently, we have the following result:
Proposition 1. Compared to the optimal regulatory contract with xed wages,
the optimal regulatory contract with wages determined by bargaining at the rm
level yields stronger incentives for e¢ciency (ie, a higher b).
Both with exogenous and with endogenous wages the regulator faces a trade-
o¤ between incentives and rent extraction. A high-powered incentive scheme
leads to high e¤ort and a low degree of rent extraction, and the optimal scheme
is the one where the two e¤ects are balanced at the margin. However, when
the wage level is endogenous, the b parameter also a¤ects wage settlement. In
particular, a higher b makes it more costly for the manager to accept wage claims
and hence reduces the workers bargaining position. Consequently, when wages are
determined by bargaining at the rm level, the rent extraction e¤ect of lowering
incentives becomes weaker. Indeed, since wages are in fact independent of b,t h e
regulator can extract rent from the manager only. As the manager gets merely a
share of the total rent, it follows that rent extraction is less important than when
the wage level is exogenous. Therefore, the regulator should put relatively less
weight on rent extraction and correspondingly more weight on e¤ort.
3.3. Centralized versus decentralized bargaining
Firm-specic wage bargaining leads to wage exibility, in the sense that wages
adjust according to the productivity of the rm. A natural question to consider
is therefore whether such wage exibility may in fact be welfare improving. The
answer to this question obviously depends on how wages would alternatively be
determined. If the regulator can himself set the wage level he will do better than
if he has to rely on the outcome of a bargaining process. However, and as argued
in the introduction, this is typically not an option.
Here we instead assume that the alternative wage determination process yields
a constant wage equal to the ex ante expected negotiated wage derived above. To
simplify the expressions we assume hereafter that the outside option wr =0 ,a n d
thus compare the outcome of the model with endogenous and exogenous wages






In this case, the average wage bill is the same with and without wage bargaining,
and we can therefore analyze whether wage exibility per se increases or decreases
10welfare. In particular, leaving aside the question of whether centralized bargaining
may on average lead to di¤erent wage levels than decentralized bargaining, this
allows us to shed some light on the desirability of having wage bargaining occur
at the industry, or economy, level rather than at the rm level.
Since, for a given b, the managers e¤ort is the same with exogenous and with
endogenous wages, the comparison is relatively straightforward. For any given b,
let the constant term a be set optimally, so that the expected social welfare with
bargaining (SW(b)) and with xed wages (SWE(b)) are given by (3.8) and (3.11),







Since this holds for all b, we must also have maxbSW(b) >m a x bSWf(b).C o n s e -
quently, we have the following result:
Proposition 2. A sl o n ga sw a g e sa r et h es a m ei ne x p e c t e dt e r m s ,s o c i a lw e l f a r e
is higher when wages are determined by bargaining at the rm level than when
they are set independently of the regulatory regime and the e¢ciency of the rm.
If the regulator can choose, therefore, he may want to allow the manager and
the worker of each rm to bargain over wages, at least as long as such bargaining
does not result in a general increase in labor costs. This raises the question of
whether in fact such an opportunity would be welcomed by the parties involved.
Obviously, workers in high-productivity rms (with low ¯s) will prefer the op-
portunity of bargaining, while workers in low productivity rms would prefer a
xed wage (and vice versa for the managers). Nevertheless, it may still be the
case that in expected terms the worker and the manager are better o¤ with wage
bargaining than with a xed wage.
Under the assumption that in expected terms the wage is the same, the worker
is obviously indi¤erent between the two wage-setting regimes. For the manager,
on the other hand, the opportunity to bargain at the rm level introduces two
opposing e¤ects. On the one hand, for a given contract b, the manager loses from
the having to share part of the overall information rent with the worker. On
the other, since in the case of rm-level bargaining the regulator o¤ers a more
high-powered incentive scheme, the overall rent over which the manager and the
worker bargain becomes larger.







(B stands for bargaining and E for ex-
ogenous). Correspondingly, the managers expected rent in the two cases are




and ¼E = bE £
¯ ¡ E¯
¤
, respectively. The manager,
therefore, prefers local bargaining if and only if bB [1 ¡ ±] ¸ bE.














It is in general not possible to characterize precisely the relationship between bB
and bE; since this depends on the shape of the function e(b), which from the rst-
order condition Ã0(e)=b, is determined by the shape of Ã0(e). However, in the
particular case in which Ã000 =0 , implying that the relationship between e¤ort
and the incentive contract is linear, we are able to obtain clear results. We may
then eliminate e0(b) from both sides of (3.15), and use the resulting expression
to nd the critical value for bE (or bB) for which the manager prefers rm-level
bargaining. We formulate the result in the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Assume Ã000 =0(implying that e0(b) is a constant). Then the
managers expected payo¤ is larger in the case in which wages are endogenously
determined by bargaining at the rm level than in the case in which wages are














Consequently, the manager prefers wage exibility only if the regulatory con-
tract is su¢ciently low-powered, in which case rents are small. Note that since
the critical value is decreasing in ±, ceteris paribus the manager is less likely to
prefer bargaining at the rm level when workers have considerable bargaining
power. The critical value for bE reaches its maximum value 1
2 when ± =0and its
minimum value 0 when ± =1 . In the case in which bargaining power is equally
distributed between the two parties (that is, ± = 1
2), the critical value equals 1=3:
4. Managerial incentives in a bargaining environment
In the previous section, we assumed that the e¤ort level was determined jointly
with wages in the bargaining game between the manager and the worker. Such
an assumption may not be entirely unreasonable if e consists of those aspects of
the operation of the rm over which the manager has preferences, including the
organization of production, administrative structure and managerial expenses. e
then measures the extent to which these aspects di¤er from the managers most-
preferred mode of operation. That the operation of the rm may be the subject
of negotiations with workers (or their representatives) is particularly likely if the
workers themselves have preferences over these matters (to account for this, w
should be interpreted as including costs of improving working conditions).
12In some cases it may nevertheless be more plausible to assume that decisions
over which the manager has preferences are within his or her own discretion.
This would, for example, be in line with the right to manage assumption often
made in the labour market literature (Layard et al, 1991). The question then
becomes whether in such a setting managerial incentives and decisions may depend
upon how wages are set, and, in particular, on the extent to which workers have
bargaining power in wage negotiations. An optimal regulatory schemes must take
into account how managerial incentives to undertake e¤ort are a¤ected by the fact
that others share in the additional rent created.
It turns out that assuming managerial discretion over e¤ort decisions does
not change the results obtained in the previous section, as long as the managers
e¤ort level is decided upon after the wage is determined.7 To see this, suppose
w is the negotiated wage. Then the manager chooses e so as to maximize ¼ =
a ¡ b[w + ¯ ¡ e] ¡ Ã(e), and hence e is determined by the rst-order condition
Ã0(e)=b. This is the same condition as (3.3). When bargaining over wages, this
e¤ort level is anticipated by the agents, and the wage is determined by equation
(3.2) as before. Therefore, for any given contract the e¤ort level and the wage
level is the same as when agents bargain over e¤ort, and it follows that the optimal
contract is unaltered as well. The reason for this equivalence result is that when
wage is set before the manager exerts e¤ort, the manager in e¤ect becomes a
residual claimant to the information rent. Consequently, from the point of view
of the worker and the manager, and given the regulatory contract, the manager
chooses e e¢ciently, just as e is set optimally in the Nash bargaining solution.
Note that this result is independent of the assumed linearity of costs.
4.1. Rent sharing and managerial incentives
Given the above result, we now turn to a model in which the manager has to
exert e¤ort before wage negotiations take place, foreseeing how the resulting gains
will have to be shared with the worker. In particular, we consider the following
move structure: First the regulator o¤ers a contract to the manager. If the
manager accepts, he has to decide how much e¤ort to undertake. Then the wage
is determined by the Nash solution to a wage bargaining game.
It is assumed that once the bargaining game takes place costs of e¤ort are
sunk, and furthermore, that the managers outside option is independent of the
7The same holds true in our set up if e⁄ort is determined before the wage is set, as long
as the disutility of e⁄ort is felt only after wage negotiations are successfully completed. Then
the wage is determined by the same condition as in the previous section. It can furthermore
be shown that the ￿rst-order condition for the manager￿s choice of e⁄ort reduces to ˆ
0
(e)=b.
Note that this result does not carry over to models with more general cost functions.
13e¤ort level. Consequently, the managers disutility of e¤ort does not enter the
Nash maximand, which now reads (with wr =0 )
N = w
– fa ¡ b[w + ¯ ¡ e]g
1¡– : (4.1)
The rst-order condition for the Nash solution becomes
1 ¡ ±
±





¡ ¯ + e
i
: (4.3)
In the second stage, the manager maximizes a¡b[w + ¯ ¡ e]¡Ã(e),w h e r ew
is given by (4.3). The rst-order condition for this problem becomes
Ã
0(e)=[ 1¡ ±]b (4.4)
Comparing (4.4) with (3.3), we obtain the following result:
Lemma 2. For a given regulatory contract, and as long as the worker has any
bargaining power (ie, ±>0), the level of e¤ort exerted by the manager is lower
in the case in which e¤ort is set before wage bargaining takes place than when it
is determined either in or after the bargaining process.
This result reects the hold-up character of the game; the manager carries
the full share of the costs of e¤ort while the worker obtains a strictly positive
share of the return. Consequently, the manager has less incentive to exert e¤ort
in this case than in the model analyzed above. This introduces two new e¤ects
that the regulator will have to consider when constructing an optimal contract.
On the one hand, since less cost-reducing e¤ort is undertaken, it becomes more
important to provide incentives for e¤ort. On the other hand, the marginal e¤ect
of increasing the power of the incentive scheme is smaller.
We derive the optimal contract by a similar procedure as in the previous
section. For any given b, the optimal value of a must be such that ¼ =0at ¯ = ¯,
or a ¡ b
£
w + ¯ ¡ e
¤
= Ã(e) > 0. From (4.1) we see that since the costs of e¤ort
are sunk, and even the least productive type must be compensated for this cost ¯,
it follows that the worker and the manager always bargain over a positive value.
Consequently, the wage is always strictly positive.
Inserting w from (4.3) into the expression for ¼ in (2.2) gives ¼ =[ 1¡ ±]a ¡
b[1 ¡ ±][¯ ¡ e] ¡ Ã(e), and we may solve the condition ¼(¯)=0to nd that the









Inserting (4.5) in the expressions for the prot ¼, the wage rate (equation 4.3)),
and summing the two give the equations

























Consequently, for a given b, the managers rent is the same as in the previous
model, while the wage is always strictly greater than zero. Note that, unlike in the
model of the previous section, in which the equilibrium wage was independent of
b, here the wage level typically depends on the power of the regulatory contract.
The expected social welfare function (from equation 2.4) becomes











where e = e(b) is given implicitly by (4.4). Comparing this with expression (3.8),
we nd that there is a new term, reecting that the worker in this model always
obtains positive rents. Furthermore, the relationship between e¤ort and the power
of the regulatory contract di¤ers. Both the higher wage and the lower e¤ort tend
to reduce social welfare. Therefore, for any given value of b, social welfare is lower
in this model than in the model considered in the previous section. Since this is
true for all b, we have the following result:
Proposition 4. Social welfare is lower in the case in which e¤ort is set before
bargaining between the manager and the worker takes place than when it is de-
termined either during or after the bargaining process.
The rst-order condition for the regulators maximization problem is given by
[1 + ¸][1¡ Ã
0]e
0(b) ¡ ¸[1 ¡ ±]













We want to compare the optimal value of b and the corresponding value of e,
which we refer to as bM and eM,w i t hbB;e B (from the case in which e¤ort is
15determined by bargaining) and bE;e E (from the case in which wage is exogenous)
derived above. One can show the following (for ±>0 a n de v a l u a t e da t(bM;e M)):8
e
M 7 e

















¡ b ? 0 (4.12)
e
M 7 e





























Ã00 ? 0 (4.14)
It would appear that, depending on the parameters of the model, managerial
e¤ort, as well as the power of the regulatory contract, may be both lower than in
the case in which wages are exogenous (ie, are not determined by bargaining at the
rm level) and higher than in the case in which managerial e¤ort is determined
by bargaining with the worker (or set after wage bargaining takes place). In
particular, compared with the outcome in the model considered in the previous
section, in this case we may well have a more high-powered incentive contract (ie,
bM >b B) and at the same time a lower level of managerial e¤ort (ie, eM <e B).
This happens when the disutility of e¤ort is quaderatic and the worker has strong
bargaining power:
Proposition 5. Assume Ã(e)=Ae2.T h e neM <e B.F u r t h e r m o r e ,bM >b B for
± su¢ciently close to 1.
Proof. We get
8These results are derived as follows: Using (4.4) (ie, ˆ0 =[ 1¡ –]b, which implies e0(b)=


















The left-hand side is decreasing in e. Consequently, if we compare with the ￿rst-order conditions
(3.9) and (3.12) (with bk substituted out with ˆ0(ek);k = B;E), we obtain (4.13) and (4.11).
In order to compare the incentive power of the contracts, we substitute ˆ0 =[ 1¡ –]b back into




















Noting that the left-hand side is decreasing in b, again we compare this ￿rst-order condition































Using (4.4) and (4.10) we nd:
e










Therefore, so long as parameters are such that problems are well dened (in
particular, the left-hand side of (4.17) is strictly positive), (4.16) becomes negative
for ± su¢ciently close to 1.
5. Strategic wage setting
So far we have considered cases in which the regulator o¤ers contracts before the
wage level is determined, in e¤ect assuming that the regulator can commit to a
regulatory scheme which is independent of the outcome of the bargaining process,
and that he will not respond to new wage agreements. In some circumstances such
an assumption is unreasonable. As pointed out above, it is usually not within the
jurisdiction of regulators to control wages directly. Furthermore, they often lack
the power or are unwilling to enter into long-term contracts. A government usually
have limited ability to bind future governments. And even if such commitments
were possible the risk of regulatory failure or incompetence, and the necessity
of allowing policies to be adjusted in the light of new information or unforeseen
contingencies, may imply that they are unacceptable.
If the regulator lacks su¢cient commitment power there may be room for
strategically using the wage setting to inuence the regulatory scheme (cf the
nding of Hendricks (1975) that wages were higher for utilities that expected
the regulator to adjust prices following a new wage agreement). In particular,
if the manager realizes that the incentive contract he is o¤ered, and hence his
information rent, depends on the outcome of the wage bargaining his strategy in
the bargaining game will be correspondingly a¤ected.
A fully satisfactory model of how wage bargaining may be used to inuence
regulatory schemes would require an explicitly dynamic framework. Our aim is
17not so wide here, and instead we briey consider how our static set up may be
used to throw light upon the issue. In particular, we consider a simple game
in which the manager and the worker bargain over wages before the regulatory
contract is o¤ered.
First consider the model described above, and suppose wages are set prior to
the contract in a bargaining game between the worker and the manager. Denote
this wage by ws. We assume that neither the worker nor the rm know the value
of the e¢ciency parameter ¯ at the time when they decide on wages, so that their
wage setting behavior does not signal any information about costs. At the time
when the regulator designs the contract the wage is given and consequently the
optimal contract will be the same as in the model with exogenous wages, with ¹ w
set equal to ws. The prot of the rm and the optimal value of b will be given
by (3.12), independently of ws. It follows that the manager is indi¤erent with
r e s p e c tt ot h ew a g el e v e l .
Suppose there is an upper bound ^ w on wages that the regulator accepts, and
that he refuses to give a contract to any rm with a wage above this level. It is
easy to see that the equilibrium wage in the bargaining game between the worker
and the rm is ^ w: Assume the equilibrium wage ws was below ^ w.T h e na ni n c r e a s e
in the wage up to ^ w results in a Pareto improvement for the agents involved in
the wage bargaining, as it makes the rm just as well o¤ and the worker better
o¤. Since the Nash solution is Pareto e¢cient ws can not be the Nash solution -
a contradiction. We have thus shown the following proposition:
Proposition 6. Assume wages are determined by Nash bargaining before the
contract is in place. Assume also that there is an upper bound ^ w on the wages
that the regulator accepts. Then the equilibrium wage is equal to ^ w.
The reason why in this model the manager is indi¤erent with respect to the
level of wages is that he in e¤ect send on to the regulator any increase in wage
costs. However, the possibility of committing to a wage level prior to the design of
the regulatory contract may have other strategic e¤ects also, which the assumed
(linear) cost structure is not rich enough to capture. For instance, the wage level
may a¤ect the amount of information rent that can be enjoyed by e¢cient types
(for any given contract). The level of wages may also a¤ect the regulators choice
of contract. As a high-powered incentive scheme leaves more rent to the manager,
he may want to use wages strategically to obtain such a high-powered contract. In
the rest of this section we illustrate these possibilities by means of some examples.
5.1. Direct e¤ects of wages on rents
With a linear cost function, there is no relationship between wages and managerial
rent for any given contract. In this sense the linear cost structure is rather special;
18it implies that neither (exogenous) productivity di¤erences nor managerial e¤ort
a¤ect labour costs. Assume instead that the cost function is given as C = w¯¡e.
Then cost di¤erences between high-and low productivity rms are increasing with
wages. An interpretation of this cost structure is that the e¢ciency parameter
reects di¤erences in capital (or technology) and that labour and capital are
alternative factors of production; in particular, if we let w¯ reect wage costs ¯
can be interpreted as the number of workers needed in production for a rm of
type ¯.9
For a contract (a;b), the rent to the manager is given by
¼ = a ¡ b[w¯ ¡ e] ¡ Ã(e) (5.1)
and the optimal choice of e¤ort is Ã0(e)=b, independently of w.S i n c e t h e
regulator leaves no rent to the least e¢cient type, ie, ¼ =0at ¯ = ¹ ¯,w e n d
a = b
£
w¹ ¯ ¡ e
¤
+Ã(e). Inserting this value of a into the expression for ¼ gives ¼ =
bw
£¹ ¯ ¡ ¯
¤
. Consequently, for any ¯<¹ ¯, and for a given contract (b), managerial
payo¤ is increasing in w. This is the direct e¤ect of wages on managerial rent.
Now, since the managerial information rent is increasing with the wage level
a high wage makes it more costly for the regulator to induce a high level of e¤ort.
Therefore, the optimal contract will imply a lower b. Formally, assuming that
worker payo¤ is given by the total wage bill, w¯ (which measures worker rent
over and above alternative wages), and inserting the expressions for ¼ and C,w e
may express the regulators objective function as follows:
ESW= S ¡ [1 + ¸][e ¡ Ã(e)] ¡ ¸w
©
E¯+ b
£¹ ¯ ¡ E¯
¤ª
; (5.2)
with e given implicitly by the condition Ã0(e)=b. The rst order condition for










Since the left-hand side is decreasing in b, it follows that b is decreasing in w.
Consequently, the higher is the wage the weaker are the incentives provided to
the manager. The e¤ect of an increase in the wage therefore has two opposite
e¤ects on managerial rent, and whether or not the manager has incentives to
restrain worker wage claims is ambiguous and depends on parameter values.
Consider again the example in which Ã000 =0 ,s ot h a tz = Ã00 = constant.
Then e0(b)=1 =z. From (5.3) we nd
9Note that we are now in fact leaving the prevailing assumption so far, that the number of
workers is given. With an endogenously determined labour force, it is no longer obvious how to


















, using (5.4) we nd
d¼
dw





Using (5.5) and (5.3), we can show the following lemma:
Lemma 3. Assume C = w¯¡e and Ã000 =0 . Then managerial rent is increasing









Consequently, with a quadratic disutility of e¤ort the manager may well prefer
high wages, at least up to a certain point. It follows that in this case also the
wage level may be set at ^ w - the highest wage level accepted by the regulator - at
least as long as b w · w0.
5.2. Direct e¤ect of wages on e¤ort level
Consider next the cost function C = ¯ + w[1 ¡ e]. We may interpret this as
describing a technology in which labour and managerial e¤ort are alternative
factors of production. In this example, we will from the outset restrict attention
to the case in which cost of e¤ort is quadratic (ie, Ã000 =0 ). We also assume
that e<1 for all relevant parameter values (which implies that some labour will
always be required). Then, for a given contract (a;b), managerial rent is given by
¼ = a ¡ bf¯ + w[1 ¡ e]g¡Ã(e); (5.7)
and the optimal choice of e¤ort is determined by the condition Ã0(e)=bw. Note
that, the higher is the wage w, the higher is managerial e¤ort, which is reasonable
as long as labour and managerial e¤ort are alternative factors of production. The
regulator leaves no rent to the least e¢cient type, hence ¼ =0at ¯ = ¹ ¯; and
consequently
a = b
©¹ ¯ ¡ w[1 ¡ e]
ª
+ Ã(e); (5.8)
where e = e(b) is the managers choice of e¤ort. Inserting a from (5.8) into the
expression for ¼ gives ¼ = b
£¹ ¯ ¡ ¯
¤
, as before. Therefore, for a given incentive
contract managerial rent is independent of the wage.
Higher e¤ort means less use of labour, and it is therefore natural to interpret
w[1 ¡ e] as the total wage bill. As in the previous section we assume that worker
20payo¤ is given by the wage bill (the rent over and above opportunity wages), so
that, inserting w[1 ¡ e] and the expression for ¼, we can express expected social
surplus as
ESW= S ¡ [1 + ¸][E¯+ Ã(e)] ¡ ¸
©
w[1 ¡ e]+b
£¹ ¯ ¡ E¯
¤ª
; (5.9)
















The left-hand side is increasing in w, while the right-hand side is independent of w.
Since e0(b) is constant as long as Ã000 =0 , it follows that b is increasing in w.T h e
higher is the wage, the more incentive powered is the contract and the higher is the
rent to the manager. The reason is that managerial e¤ort becomes more valuable
to the regulator when the wage is high (since e¤ort and labour are alternatives in
production), while the rent to the manager (for a given b) is independent of the
wage. The trade-o¤ between e¤ort and rent therefore pivots towards e¢ciency
as wages increase. Note the contrast with our nding in the previous subsection,
where increased wages were associated with a lower b. There (for a given b)h i g h e r
wages increased the rent to the manager while the importance of managerial e¤ort
stayed unaltered.
We turn now to worker incentives to increase wages. Worker objectives are to
maximize the total wage bill U = w[1 ¡ e].T h e n
dU
dw












That is, an increase in w has two e¤ects on managerial e¤ort. Firstly, for any
given contract (b) a higher wage raises incentives to exert e¤ort. Secondly, a













Inserting the expression for db=dw into (5.12), which gives de=dw = ¸=z [1 + ¸];









21Except in the pathological case in which no workers are employed (ie, e =1 ),
workers prefer higher wages as long as the initial wage is low, but not if the initial
wage is high. In the latter case workers trade o¤ higher wages for an increase
in the work force (ie, lower managerial e¤ort). In the extreme case in which the
shadow price of public funds is nil (¸ =0 ), workers always want wage increases.
Lemma 4. Assume C = ¯ + w[1 ¡ e] and Ã000 =0 . Then the manager always
prefers higher wages. Workers, on the other hand, prefer higher wages only if the
initial wage is relatively low.
We conclude that, if wages are high, we may experience the slightly unusual
outcome that managers insist on high wages in order to obtain a contract with
strong incentives and consequently a high rent, while the workers - who want to
avoid a cut in the labour force - prefers a lower wage.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have provided an analysis of how optimal regulatory contracts
should be modied if wages are endogenously set in regulated rms. A fairly
robust conclusion, at least when workers have su¢ciently large bargaining power,
is that optimal regulation provides stronger incentives for cost e¢ciency than in
the case in which wages are exogenous. There are three reasons for this: Firstly,
when wages are determined by bargaining at the rm level the regulatory contract
a¤ects the incentives for management to resist high wage claims and hence reduces
costly transfers to the rm. Secondly, since gains from managerial e¤orts to reduce
costs will be shared by the workforce ceteris paribus incentives to undertake such
e¤orts are lower when workers have bargaining power than when they have not.
In order to provide su¢cient e¤ort incentives the power of the incentive scheme
must be increased. Thirdly, if the rm has the ability to commit to a high wage,
and managerial e¤ort and labour are alternative factors of production, the optimal
contract will provide strong incentives to reduce labour costs.
Our analysis has been conducted in a highly simplied framework. While we
do not believe that our main conclusions depend critically on the assumptions
made, it would be interesting to extend the analysis in various directions. Apart
from the obvious extensions to more general technologies and contracts, extending
the framework in the following directions seems particularly interesting:
² While we have demonstrated that the management of regulated rms may
strategically exploit wage setting to inuence rents, there are also strong
incentives to reduce the extent to which rents are shared with labour. This
raises the question of how regulation may a¤ect rms choice of technology.
22One conjecture is that regulated rms may have incentives to substitute
labour for xed-priced inputs. This incentive may be enhanced if unions
bargain for slack (low e¤ort, over-manning) as well as wages.
² Regulation may not only a¤ect the outcome of wage bargaining directly,
but also indirectly by inuencing the degree of unionization. A common
conjecture is that regulation raises industry rents and hence increases in-
centives for labour to organize (if Hendricks, 1986). An analysis of this
issue would require a more developed model of the labour market in which
rms operate.10
² We have, somewhat arbitrarily, compared the outcome in our model with
the outcome in the case in which wages are xed at their expected level.
A fully satisfactorily comparison of our model with a case in which wage
bargaining occurs at the industry, or national, level would require a set up
that allows for interaction between wage setting and employment decisions.
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